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Privacy faces an existential threat. Such assertions are of course unoriginal, not even 
controversial. State spying on entire citizenries, local council snooping, omnipresent cameras, targeted 
advertisements, employee monitoring, facial recognition, heat sensors, implanted devices, drones, 
smart uniforms, the internet of things, genetic profiling, neuro-imaging, artificial intelligence, and so 
on and so forth: there are so many actual or potential privacy harms that trying to list them is a fool’s 
errand. Moreover, surveillance is now operating not only at the familiar level of sight, sound, and 
other observable senses; the “primary qualities” of space and time have also been compromised. The 
linear time and separate spaces which anchored privacy in the industrial era, have given way in the 
post-industrial age to a space-time continuum where privacy has lost all boundaries and all 
permanence. There remain, in Christena Nippert-Eng’s vivid language, precious few “islands” of 
privacy (Nippert-Eng 2010). 
It was all prophesied. Jeremy Bentham, a thinker “more important for the understanding of our 
society than Kant and Hegel” (Michel Foucault quoted in Vysniauskas 2018), foresaw the “inspection 
principle” governing not just prisons, but also mental asylums,  schools, hospitals, factories, and 
welfare agencies (Bentham 1995 [1787]). Today each and every one of these social institutions has 
been allowed to fall under more or less complete electronic surveillance.  It is not without significance 
that Bentham’s original sketch for his “Panopticon penitentiary”  has scrawled next to it a quotation 
from Psalm 139: “Thou are about my path, and about my bed: and spiest out all my ways...” (Bentham 
n.d.). Two hundred years later Theodore Roszak would denounce the quasi-religious “cult of 
information,” a mindless worship of information technology and concomitant neglect of “the true art 
of thinking” (Roszak 1994). Now in the twenty-first century the situation is chronic. Personal privacy 
in the information society is profoundly “against the flow,” at odds with the epoch’s totems of 
transparency and connectivity. Of course, there are occasional interventions, “data protection” 
initiatives such as the recent European Data Protection Regulation, but with every step forward, it is 
not long before we find ourselves two steps back. No one can seriously doubt that, as a basic fact, 
privacy is in crisis.  
It will be argued in this article that the only effective antidote to privacy’s predicament is 
“privacy fundamentalism.” This admittedly striking term has a documented history in privacy 
research. Introduced by the law professor and pioneering privacy researcher, Alan Westin, “privacy 
fundamentalists” are defined as persons “generally distrustful of organizations that ask for their 
personal information, worried about the accuracy of computerized information and additional uses 
made of it”, and “in favor of new laws and regulatory actions to spell out privacy rights and provide 
enforceable remedies.” They are different from “privacy pragmatists,” who always “weigh the 
benefits to them of various consumer opportunities and services, protections of public safety or 
enforcement of personal morality against the degree of intrusiveness of personal information sought 
and the increase in government power involved.” Privacy fundamentalists differ even more from a 
third category of “privacy unconcerned,” individuals who are “generally trustful of organizations 
collecting their personal information” and “ready to forego privacy claims to secure consumer-service 
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benefits or public-order values” (Louis Harris Associates & Westin 1990; see also Kumaraguru & 
Cranor 2005). 
Westin’s surveys throughout the 1990s showed that approximately 25% of the United States 
public were privacy fundamentalists, compared with 55% pragmatists and 20% unconcerned. 
However, he detected a diminishing of the ranks of privacy fundamentalism after 9/11, in favour of 
pragmatism (Westin 2003). Westin’s magnum opus,  Privacy and Freedom (Westin 1967), while it 
inspired privacy advocacy around the world, was shot through with pragmatism. For example, after 
expounding numerous ethical shortcomings of “polygraphs,” i.e. lie detectors, Westin ended by 
sanctioning their use, subject to certain conditions (Westin 1967, 263-267). A privacy fundamentalist 
would of course condemn these abominable and useless devices outright, as had Pope Pius XII (Westin 
1967, 263). Not long before he died, Westin would defend even that egregious American 
privacy-eater, the Patriot Act (Fox 2013). 
Today, in the face of all the new and impending threats, it is surely a philosophy of privacy 
fundamentalism, not pragmatism, that is needed. Pragmatism has been the de facto regnant philosophy 
for many decades, and it has signally failed to stem the tide of surveillance. A more robust position is 
needed, one that can fortify the dwindling band of citizens still prepared to make a principled stand for 
privacy. Little privacy loses the final argument with the big battalions of money and power: that is the 
underlying script that must be rewritten. Now some people might fully agree that privacy 
fundamentalism in Westin’s sense is required, but think that it should go by another, less off-putting, 
name. It is likely, indeed, that Westin’s use of it was all along an attempt to discredit the position it 
represents. However, the very shock-value of “fundamentalism” is at least helpful in calling attention 
to the extremely high stakes at issue. If the battle for privacy is to have any chance of being won, a 
dramatic vocabulary may prove to be an indispensable part of its arsenal. Anyway, labels aside, the 
rudiments of the content of a theory of privacy fundamentalism are ventured below. 
Elements of Privacy Fundamentalism 
The place to commence a defence of privacy is of course at the very beginning. It is obvious 
that privacy has been at a disadvantage literally from “day one.” The Book of Genesis teaches that 
humanity’s original, Edenic state was one in which privacy was totally absent. According to that 
super-seminal text, it was only after the “fall” that Adam and Eve tried to hide their “private parts.” At 
the other end of the eschatological scale, the Book of Revelation draws a picture of a future heaven of 
choirs and communion; indeed, the very idea of desiring privacy seems antithetical to a perfected 
state, religiously understood. It is hardly surprising then that the word “private” occurs only once in 
the whole of John Milton’s multivolume epic  Paradise Lost , according to John Hollander (Hollander 
2001, 22). The connotation of weakness, negativity, clings to privacy from start to finish. That much is 
evident in the cultural gene-pool of Christendom.  
Secular history, too, has always made privacy subordinate to the public, the political. In 
evolutionary rationales, survival meant that the group had to take precedence over the individual. As 
civilization came on stream, Aristotle would define “man” as a political animal. It was in the polis, the 
public arena of democratic deliberation and decision-making, that a man was in his element, was free; 
the domestic sphere, the “oikos,” was a subsidiary, necessitous, invisible realm, a back zone into 
which Aristotle notoriously consigned women, children, and slaves ( Aristotle 1941 [c. 330 BC]) . 
Privacy was indeed the realm of the “oik”, the idiot. This negative valuation carried over into the 
Roman world. The very word “privacy” shares the same Latin root as terms like “privation” and 
“deprivation.” It is no accident then that in Britain, its ruling class raised on Greek and Latin 
literature, elite schools are still called “public schools,” or conversely that the lowest rank in the 
British army is that of “private.” And this also perhaps explains why most of the outstanding 
contemporary privacy theorists are female, as will be seen. 
2 
25/02/2019 Privacy Fundamentalism - Google Docs
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Or0JiZhj0SmzhJmbl4BG-u-eeeJ0J66FYYrUsjsPK2I/edit 3/14
The deep-seated anti-privacy prejudice was never properly addressed in western thought. 
“What is surprising,” writes Lucas Introna, “is that privacy did not get explicit attention from any of 
the great liberals. Locke, Rousseau, van Humboldt, and J. S. Mill did not spend as much as a page on 
the subject” (Introna 1997, 261) ; nor, it might be added, is the idea of privacy salient in the writings of 
John Rawls, the twentieth-century philosopher who arguably completes the liberal canon. To be sure, 
private property is a major theme of all of these eminent thinkers, but privacy rights have no necessary 
connection with any form of ownership. Neither does privacy get a mention in the United States 
Constitution, although it was subsequently supposedly spotted in the “penumbra” of that great 
constitution. It would seem then that most commentators are agreed that, under liberalism, privacy 
should “wear the character of exceptions” (Bentham quoted in Hixson 1987, 102). 
However, whatever might have been appropriate or tolerable yesterday, in the information 
society we inhabit now privacy needs to come out of the shadows. Privacy cannot—in an age where 
information, including personal information, is flowing in all directions in ever-greater 
abundance—remain a secondary or derivative right, merely implicit in the first-order goods of liberty 
of speech, association, and the like. It needs to be a first-order political good in its own right, part of 
liberal-democracy’s exterior, not just its remote interior. This is the central thesis of privacy 
fundamentalism. 
Before seeking to establish privacy’s value, however, a working definition is required. No 
trivial matter, this is actually very much a challenge for any theory of privacy. Westin famously 
construed privacy as “ the claim of individuals, groups or institutions to determine for themselves 
when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others” (Westin 1967, 5) , a 
way of understanding it that is clearly suited to the information age. Since he wrote, though, much 
philosophical energy has been spent on whether “determining” does actually belong in the definition. 
Anita Allen, herself noted for being the first philosophy professor to have written a monograph on 
privacy, maintains that there is such a condition as unwanted and unpopular privacy, and that access 
rather than control is therefore the relevant yardstick (e.g., Allen 2011). However, Beate Roessler, 
another leading contemporary privacy philosopher, claims that “the moment of conscious control does 
seem to be constitutive for the meaning of privacy” (Roessler 2005, 195). Ordinary language, Roessler 
reasons, treats privacy positively, with normative and not merely descriptive content; it would not be 
natural to say of someone stuck in a crevasse that they had privacy (Roessler 2005, 7). 
Allen’s position on this is more convincing. Privacy is indeed often enforced, as revealed by 
frequent controversies over the compulsory veiling of girls and women. The flaw in control definitions 
is that they always end up collapsing privacy into adjacent concepts such as liberty and autonomy. 
This has resulted in the invention by the United States Supreme Court of “decisional” privacy, cited 
with far-reaching effects in the decriminalization of abortion, and much subsequent legislation. Yet, 
whatever the rights and wrongs of abortion, it is straining language too far to refer to it as a matter of 
privacy. Abortion is at bottom a liberty issue—the mother’s liberty, if not the foetus’s. Privacy 
fundamentalism, like all fundamentalisms, will endeavour to keep things simple, defining privacy in 
as basic a way as possible, that is, as a neutral, descriptive concept; and from that firm basis proceed to 
identify what kinds of normative arguments can be marshaled. 
So the following discussion will follow Allen in defining privacy in terms of unavailability or, 
to adopt David O’Brien’s more memorable formula, as “an existential condition of limited access” 
(O’Brien 1979, 16); and it will be confined to the privacy of individuals, not groups or institutions. 
The substantive task now is to establish that this condition denotes a fundamental human good. While 
space will not allow a detailed exposition, the coordinates of a case for privacy as a fundamental value 
can be provided. 
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First, the human need for privacy is what anthropologists call “a cultural universal.” Westin’s 
book serves again as a useful benchmark, since it summarizes scientific data from a range of reputable 
sources. For example, Westin referenced work on the fascinating Tuareg tribes of North Africa. While 
living communally in a way that cannot accommodate western expectations regarding privacy, Tuareg 
menfolk achieve similar ends by the simple expedient of veils, continuously adjusted according to 
company. Other societies make good use of masks or fans, Westin notes; Hollywood actresses, other 
defenses breached, resort of course to sun-glasses. “The Tuareg veil,” Westin soundly deduces, “is a 
symbolic realization of the need for privacy in every society” (Westin 1967, 13). Nowadays, it might 
be said that these are all examples of “privacy-enhancing technologies,” or ways of executing 
different “privacy settings.”  
Japan is another instructive case study, as recent research demonstrates (e.g.  Mizutani et al. 
2004,  Murata & Orito 2008; Nakada & Tamura 2005). The paper walls in traditional Japanese houses 
and the nudity norm in public bath-houses have occasioned the common perception of a nation lacking 
in consciousness of personal privacy rights. Its group-minded, family-centric culture high in social 
capital supposedly leaves no room for privacy. Indeed, the word does not even exist in the Japanese 
language, which must get by with the American loan word “puraibashii.” Ergo, the Japanese do not 
value individual privacy. However, this is a complete misreading of the situation. They do bathe 
naked, but they preserve gender boundaries punctiliously. The walls in their houses can be thin, yet a 
taboo on eavesdropping and indiscretion preserves the privacy peace. They do not have a direct 
equivalent for “privacy” but they have plenty of cognate terms, such as k odoku ( solitude) and himitsu 
( secrecy). Like the Tuareg, then, the Japanese just “do” privacy differently.  
All the evidence indicates that privacy is a cultural universal (see especially Moore 2018 and 
van der Geest 2018 ). In the terms of the present article, privacy is a “cultural fundamental,” and its 
being such is the scientific spine of the case for privacy fundamentalism. However, if privacy is to be 
properly founded, privacy fundamentalism needs to dig deeper. While privacy is undoubtedly a 
cultural fundamental, its precise content is by all accounts geographically variable. It also changes 
over time. Indeed, “time-honoured” legal barometers such as “reasonable expectation of privacy” are 
under immense pressure, now that it is beginning to feel unrealistic to expect any privacy, especially 
outside the home, at least in the West. Arguments at the empirical level can thus only take us so far. 
It is at this point then that the theory of privacy needs to risk becoming more contentious. 
Privacy fundamentalism postulates that privacy cannot be secured unless some kind of metaphysical 
case is made for it, in addition to all the empirical data. Specifically, it is the proposal of privacy 
fundamentalism as understood here that privacy’s value must be anchored in an unchanging reality, an 
objective spiritual and moral order existing independently of the empirical world. Of course, this is not 
a fashionable kind of claim. Graham Sewell and James Barker are probably expressing western 
scholarly opinion much more faithfully when they present privacy as a principle that sternly rejects 
“eschatology” and “universal ontological categories” (Sewell & Barker 2001, 187). However, majority 
academic opinion is not necessarily either morally right or socially expedient. 
According to privacy fundamentalism, privacy is an essential condition for the flourishing of 
the inner self, that is, of the “soul;” and its being so makes personal privacy inviolable. At one level, 
this is hardly an esoteric claim: our basic instincts scream that privacy is infinitely precious, as well as 
inscrutable. The tricky philosophical issue is how to ground these familiar intuitions. Of course, it 
would not do to try to fasten them onto the axioms of religious fundamentalism, eschatological or 
otherwise, since while most ordinary people are in some sense religious, they are mostly not 
fundamentalists. Hence a broader metaphysical argument is called for. Here idealism, and specifically 
British idealism, a nineteenth-century school of thought currently undergoing intensive reappraisal 
(e.g., Boucher & Vincent 2012; Duff 2015; Mander & Panagakou 2016; Tyler 2017), can, it is 
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suggested, supply extremely helpful pointers. Although the idealists did not focus on privacy per se, 
their general worldview, developed in response to the naturalism of their own day, contained powerful 
concepts that can be repurposed for the promotion of one of the greatest causes of the twenty-first 
century. 
Their central claim was that there is an “ideal” world as well as a natural one. “The real man,” 
T. H. Green, the founder of British idealism, asserted, “is not an object of observation” (Green 1886a, 
108). Our very consciousness, he continued, implies the existence of a further, invisible, reality. It is 
necessary, therefore, to make an essential distinction between our “empirical” selves, belonging to the 
sensible world and hence accessible to psychology and anthropology, and our “real” selves, which 
exist somehow outside of space and time (Green 2003, 189). This ideal order is unverifiable, to be 
sure, and the right of privacy can never therefore be positively demonstrated. However, as Green 
astutely pointed out,  all rights and values are insensible and therefore both unverifiable and, by the 
same token, unfalsifiable (Green 1886b, 362). That does not necessarily make them unreal; quite the 
opposite. The case for privacy, as indeed for liberty and other more widely acknowledged 
ethico-political values, can be rendered in terms of its being necessary for the flourishing of this real 
self. 
Green and many other idealists went a step further and invoked a divine consciousness, of 
which human consciousness, they deduced, formed a part, and to which reason and conscience served 
as a conduit. The real self is part of this hallowed world, and so privacy, it can be inferred, protects 
what is sacred. To reiterate, this is not religious fundamentalism, although it is compatible with such; 
it is an inclusive way of establishing privacy not just as a  cultural fundamental but also as some kind 
of  spiritual fundamental. Its salutary effect, if accepted, is a reversal of the worldly, Aristotelian 
identification of the real self with the public realm. Man, on this alternative view, is not essentially a 
political animal, but rather a spiritual being—and to realise that essence, she needs privacy. While the 
outer self is empirical, part of the physical word, the real self is spiritual, metaphysical, ideal. This is 
not to say that we have two selves. It is rather that the real, inward self is ontologically prior to the 
staged self, the self-for-others. The real self is what needs affirmation, because it is this that is the 
ultimate target of totalitarianism. In such a light, it is legitimate, and given current dangers surely 
politically desirable, to call the right to privacy sacred. 
In saying that privacy is necessary for the protection of the real self, it might seem that privacy 
is thereby being demoted from a fundamental to an intermediate or instrumental good. In one sense, 
the point must be conceded. Privacy is not an ultimate, still less  the ultimate, good. It logically cannot 
be, because privacy is a relation, and therefore not the kind of category that can be the possessor of 
ultimate value. However, as Roessler has clearly explained, foregrounding privacy does not mean that 
one cannot also ground it in a further value (Roessler 2005). In her case, that ultimate value is a 
modernistic notion of individual autonomy. In our case, it is a traditional notion of the spiritual 
welfare of the soul. The key claim for present purposes is that privacy can and should be treated as a 
first-order political good. It is again exactly the same in this respect as liberty. Liberty is no more a 
final good than is privacy; liberty is also a relation, also therefore necessarily intermediate. Yet liberty 
is by all accounts endorsed as a first-order political good. Privacy fundamentalism only requests the 
same consideration for privacy.  
Privacy Fundamentalism in Context 
Privacy is thus a fundamental good, in the sense of being both empirically universal and 
spirtually essential, but as has been suggested above it is also to some extent culturally, and more 
generally, contextually, sensitive. Again, this should not be too puzzling, since the same is true of 
other first-order political goods. A primitive privacy fundamentalism might try to insist that privacy is 
an “absolute” that always trumps every other claim, but a sophisticated and viable privacy 
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fundamentalism must accept that privacy is not the only important value. Privacy claims are not 
necessarily valid, because they can be outweighed by other values, such as freedom—of information 
or of the press, say—not to mention national security. The truth is that nothing is inalienably either 
private or public. For example, no item, in ordinary circumstances, could be more public than 
surnames, yet a surname must become terribly private the moment that it is in danger of winding up 
on a terrorist hit-list. It all depends on the context. So to have credibility, privacy fundamentalism 
needs to be compatible not only with the overall technological and political environment, but also 
with the specific social worlds within which innumerable information disclosures have to take place. 
The most important contemporary case for a contextual approach is that of Helen Nissenbaum, 
herself also a strong advocate of privacy rights, if not necessarily a privacy fundamentalist in the sense 
under development here. In her remarkable and widely influential treatise  Privacy in Context , 
Nissenbaum disputes the common attachment of privacy to special places, such as the home, and to 
special information, such as intimate personal details. Such equations, based on a rigid dichotomy of 
private versus public, do not account for some of our basic intuitions about privacy, she argues. For 
example, they do not allow for privacy in public or in the workplace; they also position privacy too 
close to secrecy, an association that has done privacy’s reputation much damage (Roessler 2010, 
103-126). 
In place of these brittle, unsustainable distinctions, Nissenbaum offers a theory of privacy as 
“neither a right to secrecy nor a right to control but a right to  appropriate flow of personal 
information” (Nissenbaum 2010, 127, italics in original). Appropriateness depends on the situation. 
Echoing Ferdinand Schoeman’s observation that “one important function of privacy is to help 
maintain the integrity of different spheres of life” (Schoeman 1992, 157), Nissenbaum crafts an 
innovative benchmark that she calls “the framework of contextual integrity.” (Roessler 2010, 127-157) 
This framework specifies the mix of values, purposes and practices that make a particular social 
domain, for example medicine or banking, what it is. Thus, the purpose of medicine is the health of 
patients, and all conduct in a medical context should reflect norms associated with that purpose, 
informational norms included. It is consonant with medicine that patients should reveal their health 
data, including details whose disclosure would be highly inappropriate in any other context. Yet if a 
health professional were to ask for a patient’s bank statements, that would constitute a privacy 
infringement, financial data being entirely irrelevant to the medical context. The situation is exactly 
reversed in the social context of interactions with one’s bank manager. 
The upshot is that information should only be transmitted in a way appropriate to the situation 
at hand. Privacy fundamentalism, despite its stringent ethic and its anchorage in a putative ideal 
reality, concurs that no information is so secret that its transmission can never be justified. It 
maintains, nevertheless, that violations of contextual integrity have become a rampant evil which must 
now be stopped.  
A disputatious stance is integral to privacy fundamentalism. However, establishing privacy as 
an essential value, and a moral right to which persons in every tribe and nation are entitled, does not 
mean that this right should always be reified in law. That too depends entirely on the circumstances. 
The cardinal political error of religious fundamentalism, as in both Christian Puritanism and Islamic 
Shariah Law, is its failure to grasp the difference between sin and crime. People have rights to love, 
respect and many other good things, but it is not always appropriate to enforce such claims; and 
privacy is no different. Even lawyers Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’ seminal article “The Right 
to Privacy” (Warren & Brandeis 1890), while setting out for the first time the case for a presumptive 
general right to privacy, pled only for citizen redress against one specific intrusion, namely, press 
photographing of private dwellings. More recently, Priscilla Regan has demonstrated that “legislating 
privacy” only works effectively in the modern world when general principles are “reducible to clear 
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legal rules” (Regan 1995, 178). Privacy fundamentalism does not, therefore, aim for an all-purpose, 
almighty Privacy Torah. Nevertheless, privacy fundamentalism will be prepared to wield the civil 
sword when necessary. In situations where personal privacy is in manifest danger, state action is 
sometimes, as a last resort, the correct mode of protection.  
Policy Applications of Privacy Fundamentalism 
Now that the nuts and bolts of a theory of privacy both fundamentalist and flexible are in 
place, it is possible to proceed to apply it to concrete issues. The following will be considered: closed 
circuit television, encryption, and newspaper expos é s. This is admittedly only a small sample of 
issues, but it is one that addresses notoriously hard cases, and that traverses a wide social and political 
terrain. While the treatment can only be introductory, it will seek to indicate in outline that privacy 
fundamentalism is not about stemming necessary flows of information in the information society, but 
about securing an “existential condition of limited access” in modern, morally complex 
socio-technical situations.  
“Despite consistent poll results showing concern about something called ‘privacy’,” John 
Gilliom writes, “technologies which would have once looked Orwellian now mark the face of the 
social landscape” (Gilliom 2001, 124). The expansion of “cctv” is well advanced in the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and many other countries. Cameras have been placed, by authorities of 
various kinds, in streets, classrooms, courtrooms, parks, airports, swimming pools, music venues and 
innumerable other locations. The public remains largely oblivious. For a start, most of the cameras are 
not actually “closed circuit;” they are open circuit, that is, linked to the internet. According to the 
Royal Academy of Engineers, “the continued use of the term [cctv] is an indicator of a general lack of 
awareness on the nature of contemporary surveillance” (Royal Academy of Engineers 2007, 33). The 
UK’s official watchdog now recommends they be referred to as “video surveillance camera systems” 
(Surveillance Camera Commissioner 2018, 12). However, whatever they are technically, they are a 
massive problem normatively. Omnipresent cameras clash with precisely the human essence that 
privacy should protect. They make us act as though we are on parade; we become targets, suspects, 
objects. For Roessler, such surveillance forces a shift from a first-person to a third-person perspective, 
resulting in “a loss of autonomy in terms of the authenticity of one’s behaviour, which is turned into 
behaviour  as if , that is alienated behaviour” (Roessler 2005, 129). Idealistically-speaking, it oppresses 
the real self, the soul. 
Admittedly, official video surveillance has not yet invaded the home, unlike the infamous 
“telescreens” in  Nineteen Eighty-Four  (Orwell 1949). Yet, as Nissenbaum has emphasised, people 
should have some privacy even in public (Nissenbaum 2010). Where the world beyond one’s front 
door becomes immediately a panopticon, the social fabric has basically unraveled. The integrity of the 
ordinary activity—sipping coffee in the plaza, dancing at a rock concert, the quiet woodland 
stroll—has been fatally compromised; the time-honoured verities of presumption of innocence, 
reasonable suspicion, and due process have disappeared. Privacy fundamentalism must therefore 
problematize the relentless roll-out of video surveillance and its attendant technologies. The 
increasing addition of microphones and loudspeakers to video surveillance cameras in the UK—“Pick 
up that litter you just dropped!” (Clout 2007)—is a blatantly Orwellian innovation. An ongoing 
campaign by Britain’s best privacy pressure group, Big Brother Watch, is thus worthy of a citation. 
Called “Face Off”, it confronts the British police’s disproportionate use of automatic facial 
recognition cameras, deployed at Champions League matches, Stereophonics gigs, Notting Hill 
carnivals, and even Remembrance Sunday services (Big Brother Watch 2018). 
None of this need entail universal proscription. In Germany, a more or less complete ban on 
street cameras is in place, and this is totally understandable in light of that country’s specific history of 
state takeover by a genocidal totalitarian party. However, for other western democracies a less 
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draconian stance may be appropriate. Indeed, the very nature of some public spaces makes supervision 
morally uncontroversial. Car parks, for example, do not lose their contextual integrity if they are under 
round-the-clock surveillance, since their function is strictly limited to safe harbor of expensive metal 
objects. The environs of pubs and clubs with track records of violence are also a fitting location for 
cameras; indeed, where the problem is known to be acute, cameras  inside these venues might be 
legitimate, since conducive to their intrinsic end of people’s enjoyment. But most cultural and 
political activities should not be officially monitored; and only the most crime-prone urban and rural 
spaces should be permanently wired up. Of course, if a terrorist cell or a serial killer is known to be 
working a particular area, then blanket surveillance could be justified until they are caught, but such 
circumstances are exceptional. History confirms that the removal of personal privacy is the essence of 
authoritarianism; and the scale of video surveillance that liberal-democracies are now allowing can 
only lead to that frightful end. 
That the defense of privacy is compatible with law and order comes through in my next 
example. It might be thought that encryption, the making of computer communications 
indecipherable,  is a “slam dunk” for privacy fundamentalism. It was the issue that galvanized the 
privacy movement in the 1990s in its opposition to the “Clipper chip,” the authorities’ backdoor key to 
electronic messages (Gurak 1997). It is still a cause c élè bre in Silicon Valley, bound up with 
cyber-libertarian philosophy and its genetic antipathy to state power. The right to perfect encryption is 
highly questionable, however. While official spying of the populace as a matter of course is indeed 
unacceptable, as incompatible with the fundamental political context of democracy, the investigation 
of genuine suspects is not. But if digitized messages cannot be read, then the police cannot do their 
jobs in the special context of criminal investigations. Instead, an anarchic zone “above the law” is 
created, and carte blanche given to organized crime and other evil-doing. This too is unacceptable. 
There is, to be sure, a “black box” that privacy fundamentalism must protect, but it contains the 
human soul, and that alone. Thus privacy fundamentalism on this issue converges with what feminists 
have long argued, that privacy should not be a shield for abuse  (DeCew 2015). The 2015 massacre in 
San Bernadino, California, after which Apple, citing privacy concerns, refused to help the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation to access an iPhone belonging to one of the terrorists, illustrates as clearly as 
anything could the difference between a true and a false privacy fundamentalism. All Tim Cook, 
Apple CEO, really achieved by his stubborn stance was to bring privacy into disrepute (Duff 2016; see 
also Bay 2017). The American Library Association, it should be noted, begs to differ (American 
Library Association 2016). 
Privacy fundamentalism will never hinder the authorities in the legitimate conduct of their 
business. However, finally, privacy fundamentalism will also often support the state’s perennial 
adversary, a free and investigative press. Press freedom is of course one of the best established 
first-order democratic values, and privacy is usually cast as being in conflict with it. But on closer 
inspection, the antithesis is revealed to be only superficial. An essential function of the press is to act 
as a “watchdog” on all forms of social power, and where the common good necessitates penetration 
into private spaces, its interventions can be legitimate. Indeed, even the sharpest forms of press 
intrusion, such as undercover operations, are sometimes justifiable. Now it might be thought that these 
are precisely the kinds of activities that a fundamentalist-Nissenbaumian approach would condemn: 
for what is such work if not a rude unraveling of the social fabric, eventuating in revelatory headlines 
like “Concealed Tapes Catch Sports Coach Plotting to Fix Games?” 
However, privacy fundamentalism would actually tend to support the press in such cases. 
While the context of a supposedly private conversation in a “sting” is indeed compromised, the press 
thereby serves the intrinsic purposes of sport—sportsmanship, fair competition, gratification of the 
hero-worshiping public—far more faithfully than corrupt coaches. The latter’s real selves are not 
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trespassed upon in any meaningful sense, their “existential condition of limited access” hardly 
nullified. Privacy only ever demands an  appropriate restriction of personal information, and in a great 
many media expos é s the supervening context of a bona fide inquiry palpably in the public interest 
implies that the transmission of embarrassing or incriminating personal information is ultimately 
justified. It is thus quite congruous that some of the staunchest supporters of the press and of freedom 
of expression and information, such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, are also great champions of privacy. Indeed, an investigative press remains by far the 
strongest bulwark of the privacy of ordinary people. The moral of all these sketches—they do not 
claim to be anything more—is that privacy fundamentalism requires as much careful casuistry as 
privacy pragmatism and any other philosophy of privacy.  
 
The Personal Practice of Privacy Fundamentalism 
Such in outline is the theory of privacy fundamentalism. However, it would not be 
fundamentalism at all if it were only theory, because fundamentalism demands the outworking of 
principles in personal practice: it is never just an abstract theory but also a “philosophy of life.” Much 
of the ablest recent privacy apologetics has sought to compute privacy’s value to society (e.g., Lever 
2011; Roessler & Mokrosinska 2015; Solove 2008; Waldman 2018). However, it is the individual who 
is finally at the center of privacy fundamentalism, the individual poised—at least sometimes—against 
society. Now the characteristic modes of fundamentalist praxis are obvious: counterculturalism, 
anti-establishmentarianism, protestology. Those who want to conserve privacy need to be prepared to 
act in such ways against the increasing onslaught of surveillance in all its guises. Instead, more and 
more citizens are morphing into privacy pragmatists or even privacy unconcerned, in Westin’s 
language, “knights of infinite resignation” in Soren Kierkegaard’s. Judgment cannot be too harsh: it is 
easy to fall into the temptation to believe that the “technological imperative” cannot be disobeyed, 
that the “surveillant assemblage” is too imbricated in our lives to be undone, and therefrom either to 
make too many concessions or to give up caring altogether. But that is not how a  fundamentalist 
thinks; she or he is governed by faith and hope, not despair, and only by walking that narrow way, I am 
suggesting, will we be delivered from the evil of technocracy. 
This does not mean that every encroachment by technology, every infringement of contextual 
integrity, can be resisted. Battles need to be picked carefully. However, we should all be prepared to be 
a little more awkward next time the local council or the dentist demands irrelevant information, next 
time a private company requires inordinate data input, next time our employer pilots a new form of 
digital tracking, and next time a camera appears in a facility that we frequent. We, the citizenry, need 
to say openly, “I think that that is an invasion of privacy,” and to take the trouble to write a letter or 
email to management, to the union, to the newspaper. This kind of individual action is largely missing 
today, but it is where—at the “grassroots”—resistance should be happening. 
The forces of panopticism are overwhelmingly superior to whatever is available on the other 
side. Now, as with any unequal struggle, this sooner or later poses the agonizing question of the 
legitimacy of extra-parliamentary and illegal behavior. Privacy fundamentalism should not be seduced 
into the extremist ways of Luddism. Fearing for their livelihoods as craftsmen, the original Luddites 
smashed the machines of the early industrial revolution, threatening the property, privacy, and 
personal safety of individuals whom they associated with the new economic order. Today 
neo-Luddites, so-called, indulge in computer hacking and other forms of sabotage; on their fringes 
there is even support for the “unabomber,” Ted Kaczynski, who from his filthy forest hideout 
prosecuted a lethal letter-bomb campaign against those he counted members of the 
“scientific-technological establishment” (Jones 2006, 222-227). That is emphatically not the spirit of a 
privacy fundamentalism resting on idealism and deontological ethics, and engaged with the real 
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world. Privacy fundamentalism does not involve a blanket denial of technological progress, it does not 
demonize the “information revolution,” and it certainly does not condone any form of violence.  
Nevertheless, one step that may reluctantly need to be taken is “obfuscation.” That is to say, 
privacy fundamentalism points to the conclusion that incomplete or inaccurate personal data should in 
some cases be given where there are exorbitant requests for information—for example, a survey that 
impudently demands intimate lifestyle facts, or an airline that insists upon a mobile phone number. It 
is increasingly frequently the case that without filling in such data, it is impossible to proceed with an 
online booking or other service. In such cases, privacy fundamentalists will, arguably, sometimes need 
to enter false data. This is the conclusion at which Nissenbaum has arrived as well, no doubt equally 
reluctantly (Brunton & Nissenbaum 2015; see also Hauptman 2018). 
It is possible that a strict Kantian would denounce obfuscation as a form of lying, but the 
riposte has to be that one is effectively left with no choice. Web 2.0 technologies do not allow one to 
plead a “fifth amendment;” one must either input data or one is discontinued; but if the request 
compromises one’s privacy, and this is so in a multiplicity of contexts, and if there is no realistic 
alternative to using the service, then even a robust morality of duty surely cannot necessitate 
self-incrimination and the “selling of one’s soul.” Consciences can be cleared by the reflection that 
one is really “lying,” if lying it is, to machines and systems, not to fellow human beings; and that 
obfuscation is being resorted to, not with a hand on a Bible in the witness box, but in an impersonal 
technological matrix for whose existence the subject has never been given the right of consent. If 
enough people subvert the system in this way, it will become unworkable, and a fundamental change 
in societal direction may become possible. At any rate, the individual will have protected her privacy 
and saved herself from being merely another captive of the cult of information. 
Conclusion 
We are becoming totally “informatized,” with ubiquitous surveillance an inevitable and 
unwelcome corollary of this process. Surveillance’s antithesis and antidote, personal privacy, has long 
been an aspect of liberalism’s interior, an indispensable backdrop to the iconic democratic principles 
of liberty, justice, etc, yet it has somehow never graduated into a first-order value in its own right. This 
is the anomaly that has to be rectified. Now—in the age of information—privacy must assume its 
rightful place at the forefront of major political categories. An attempt has been made in the present 
article to offer some preliminary tenets of such a theory of privacy, what has been called, adopting a 
term introduced by privacy leader Alan Westin, “privacy fundamentalism.” With privacy defined as an 
individual’s existential condition of limited access, privacy fundamentalism plants the right to privacy 
not just in cultural universalism but also in a metaphysics of the self, of the “real” self, a position that 
has been extrapolated from the resurgent idealist worldview. I have tried to articulate a strong theory 
of privacy, but one that is also fully compatible with the complicated contexts of competing 
considerations in the real world. Details aside, however, the main message is stark. Privacy’s cause 
will soon be lost completely if it continues to be fought merely pragmatically. Like the bodily 
sacrilege of torture, the violation of the spiritual state of privacy must be rejected without 
equivocation simply “because it is wrong” (Fried & Fried 2010).   
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